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Executive Summary 
 
During the last five years, Bolivia received more than $US 3,000 million in foreign aid and 
more than $US 3,500 million in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The country also 
received debt relief with a net present value of $US 1,300 million and implemented a 
National Poverty Reduction Strategy. During the same period, however, the GDP growth 
rate fell from an average level of 4.7% between 1993 and 1998 to an average level of 1.7% 
between 1999 and 2002, relative and absolute poverty increased, and the fiscal deficit 
increased to 8.7% of GDP in 2002. 
 
These numbers suggest that neither foreign aid, nor debt relief, nor FDI has the capacity to 
increase growth rates and reduce poverty in Bolivia. This, however, is not necessarily true. 
It could be the case that without these positive shocks, the situation would have been even 
worse due to other negative shocks. The only way to separate the effects of different shocks 
is to use a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model, where the effects of changes in 
one variable can be analyzed while holding all other exogenous variables constant.  
 
The model used for this project contains a variety of sectors and household types which 
permits the analysis of aggregate effects on the GDP growth rate, the balance of payments, 
the fiscal deficit, etc, as well as distributional effects indicating who benefits and who is 
hurt by different policies. The distributional analysis is of particular importance when 
poverty is a main concern since aggregate GDP growth does not necessarily reduce 
poverty. Estimations by UDAPE indicate that the elasticities of poverty with respect to 
changes in GDP are extremely low in Bolivia: Only 0.3% in rural areas and 0.6% in urban 
areas
1. This means that during the last decade, growth in Bolivia has clearly not been pro-
poor, despite the stated emphasis on poverty reduction.  
  
During the period 1998-2002, Bolivia received on average $614 million in foreign aid per 
year. For the period 2003-2006, there are commitments implying that this amount will 
increase to $872 million per year, which means an increase in the level of annual foreign 
aid of $258 million. This report used the CGE model to simulate the effect of additional 
foreign donations of $258 million per year for four years, after which the level of aid 
returns to its “normal” level. Such a simulation allows us to see the effects of the initial 
expansion, the effect of the subsequent contraction, as well as the long run effects after the 
temporary increase in foreign aid. 
 
The effects of this extra aid will obviously depend on how the money is used. Applying the 
combination of public spending and public investment that we consider most likely, the 
simulations show an increase in the GDP growth rate of approximately 1 percentage point 
per year during the four years of extra aid, but when the extra aid disappears, the growth 
rates return to their normal levels. It is important to stress that public investment in the 
model is assumed to produce public goods, which increase the productivity of everybody. 
 
The extra aid has a corresponding positive effect on average incomes of the households for 
four years, but those who benefit most are skilled workers who are already among the 
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richest in Bolivia, while the biggest and poorest group in Bolivia, the rural small-holders, 
are worse off every year during and after the extra aid, compared to the base scenario 
(without extra aid). This means that foreign aid, despite the very best intentions, tends to 
increase inequality and deepen poverty. 
   
This is not due to project failure at the micro level, but rather to adverse secondary effects 
at the macro level. It is perfectly possible that all aid projects are successful at the micro 
level, while the impacts at the macro level remain very close to zero. This paradox between 
the success of projects at the micro level and the lack of success at the macro level can be 
explained by the following arguments:  
 
First, aid projects distract resources away from other activities. Even when projects are 
100% funded by foreign donations (the assumption used in the simulations), the project will 
use human resources which, in the absence of the project, could have been applied 
elsewhere. Since foreign aid projects usually skim the cream in terms of local human 
resources, this may imply a large social opportunity cost. This effect is particularly 
important in Bolivia, where the public sector (with the heavy support of foreign aid) is so 
attractive that few professionals are interested in working in the private, productive sector. 
And since this system appears to be relatively permanent, the new generations of students 
are demanding education that qualifies them to be politicians and bureaucrats, while few 
students are planning on working in the private sector, and much less create their own 
enterprises. 
 
Besides, not all aid projects are fully financed by donations, the majority of projects are 
financed by loans, and those that include a donation component, usually requires 
counterpart financing. This means that aid projects not only distract scarce human resources 
away from other activities, but also scarce financial resources. 
 
The second adverse macroeconomic effect arises through the real appreciation of the 
exchange rate that invariably follows from a large influx of dollars into the economy. This 
negatively affects most exporting sectors as their products become relatively more 
expensive on the international markets, and it negatively affects domestic producers of 
tradable goods as they have to compete with cheaper imports. The result is a reduction in 
the domestic production of tradable goods. Theoretically, the Central Bank could   
neutralize this effect by increasing its reserves of dollars or by paying off foreign debt, but 
this is unlikely to happen as most aid is tied to specific projects. 
 
The fact that the macroeconomic effects of foreign aid on monetary indicators tend to be 
small and temporary does not imply that foreign aid is useless. Many non-monetary 
indicators of well-being have increased substantially during the period, especially the 
indicators related to school enrollment, health, water, and sanitation. 
 
The Bolivian government is well aware of the asymmetry between progress in the provision 
of basic services and the lack of progress in the capacity of the population to increase its 
incomes: The real per capita income in Bolivia is practically the same as it was 50 years 
ago, despite the advances in education, health and basic services. The government is 
therefore changing the focus of its Poverty Reduction Strategy, laying more emphasis on   5
the productive sectors. Fourteen sub-sectors with a high employment generation capacity 
have been selected for particular interventions in terms of infrastructure, market access, 
technical assistance, training, etc. Ten of these sub-sectors are part of modern agriculture, a 
sector whose expansion, according to our CGE analysis, would be beneficial not only 
because it raises average incomes, but also because it improves the income distribution. 
This is in contrast to the hydrocarbon sector and the mining sector, whose expansions tend 
to worsen the income distribution.  
 
Another sector whose expansion is highly desirable from a poverty reduction viewpoint, is 
the one producing consumer goods, usually through small and medium sized enterprises. 
The expansion of this sector would benefit the two big groups of poor households in 
Bolivia: the rural small-holders and the urban informals, and thus have a beneficial effect 
on both rural and urban poverty. 
 
In order to generate the largest and most sustainable impact possible of future foreign aid, it 
is recommended that donors and the government revise projects in three dimensions: 
 
•  First, they should check to which extent the projects create true public goods that 
increase the productivity of large groups of people, and to which extent they just 
generate short run activities which substitute for other, and possibly more 
sustainable, activities. The larger the public good component, the better the long run 
impact.  
 
•  Second, they should evaluate whether the projects help reduce the scarcity of skilled 
workers. It is the scarcity of skilled workers and the abundance of unskilled workers 
that generate high inequality in Bolivia, and projects which improve the quality of 
unskilled workers would tend to have a positive effect on the distribution of income 
in Bolivia and thus a beneficial effect on poverty. 
 
•  Third, they should check which sectors are likely to benefit or suffer from different 
projects, as the expansion of the sectors modern agriculture, coca, and consumer 
goods will have a much better impact on poverty than the expansion of mining, 
hydrocarbons, and formal services. 
 
It is often difficult to predict the impact of specific projects, and particularly difficult to 
assess how big the public good component of the project is. In order to learn from the past, 
it would be interesting to make a detailed retrospective analysis of past aid projects in 
Bolivia, evaluating which public goods have been created and what has been their impact 
on productivity. Specifically, donor agencies could provide a complete list of projects 
completed during the year 2000, and an independent team could analyze the project 
documentation and visit the project site some years after conclusion in order to evaluate the 
impact of the project. With a sample of 60-100 projects, it would be possible to make a 
statistical analysis, identifying what kind of projects would be most likely to generate not 
only positive impacts at the micro level but also at the macro level. 
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“It is simply impossible to violate, ignore  
or shortcut the development process.” 
 






Theoretically, foreign aid can be an important ingredient in the development of a host 
country. The growth of the economy depends on its productive capacity, that is the amount 
of capital in a wide sense (physical, human, and social). All these capitals are working 
together to generate goods and services that the society can consume (or trade). Because of 
that, the increase in the total capital can have important effects on productive capacity, and 
thus on incomes. To the extent that foreign aid helps to increase the total amount of capital, 
it can help push a country to a higher output and income trajectory. 
 
In addition, it has been argued that in poor countries, the process of growth requires a 
certain level of capital (physical, human, and social). If a society has a stock of capital that 
is below that level, the returns to investment are decreasing, and the long run equilibrium is 
reached at a low level of income. On the other hand, if a certain level of capital is reached, 
the economy moves into a stage of increasing returns, that pushes the rate of growth of the 
economy to high levels in a permanent way (above the rate of growth of the population), or 
the economy goes to an equilibrium in which the rate of growth of the economy is equal to 
the rate of growth of the population, but at higher levels
2. 
 
On the other hand, it is possible that foreign aid can provide necessary resources to reduce 
liquidity constraints in the poorest economies. In this case, these economies are unable to 
generate enough saving to generate a higher level of capital, because their needs of 
consumption exhaust their income, and are not able to finance an increase of capital. In this 
case, external aid can alleviate the financial restrictions, helping in this way to enhance the 
resource allocation of the society, and generating more capital and growth in the less 
developed economies. 
 
After half a century of development aid, a golden rule for development assistance projects 
at micro level has developed. Around 1/3 of the projects are successful, in the sense that 
they achieve their goals and local institutions take ownership of them, in such a way that 
the project can continue once the external cooperation withdraws. Another 1/3 of the 
projects achieve their goals but do not achieve local ownership, so the project ends quickly 
once the donors leave. The last 1/3 does not even reach the immediate targets of the 
projects. Projects in Latin America tend to follow the average, while projects in Africa tend 
perform considerably worse, and projects in Asia tend to be mores successful
3. Given these 
results, one would expect that projects in Bolivia will behave according to the average. 
 
                                                 
2 Velasco, A. e Illanes, F. (1994) 
3 Banco Mundial (2001).   7
Even in the worst cases, the projects will have short run benefits, because they create jobs 
and temporal increases in incomes, at least for some people, so one would expect a positive 
impact of aid, even if some projects fail. At the macro level, such a positive impact has 
been difficult to show. Most studies conclude that external aid either does not have any 
impact on the growth rate, or that its impact is negative
4. This contradiction between micro 
and macro impacts is sometimes considered a paradox
5, but the present document shows 
that there are logic explanations that can explain this contradiction. 
 
The document is organized in the following way: Section 2 shows the distribution and 
persistence of poverty in Bolivia, while Section 3 summarizes the national strategies to 
reduce poverty. As the effectiveness of foreign aid depends crucially on the quality of local 
policies, section 4 discuses the problem of governance and its implication for the 
decentralization process, while section 5 analyses the fiscal policy and public investment. 
Section 6 describes the composition of external aid in the last 5 years and tries to connect 
the disbursed amounts in each sector with the changes in the sector indicators designed to 
measure the progress. Section 7 uses a general equilibrium model to examine the 
macroeconomic and distributional impact of external aid, distinguishing these from other 
positive or negative shocks. Section 8 uses the same model to see the effects of the HIPC II 
initiative. Section 9 analyses the role of exports and identifies the exporting sectors that 
have more poverty reducing capacity. Section 10 discusses the impact of direct foreign 




2  Poverty in Bolivia 
 
According to the national Census of 2001, 58.6% of the total population of Bolivia had 
unsatisfied basic needs (UBN) that year. This reflects an average reduction of only 1.33 
percentage points per year since 1992. As shown in Table 1, the regions that were initially 
less poor have shown sharper reductions in poverty than the initially poorest regions, 
implying that regional inequality is widening. Potosí continues to be the poorest department 
in the country, with 79.7% of its population with unsatisfied basic needs, less than one 
percentage point less than in 1992 (80,5%). Santa Cruz, on the other hand, had the lowest 
level of unsatisfied basic needs in 1992 and showed the biggest reduction between 1992 
and 2001 (22,5 percentage points). 
 
An alternative way of measuring poverty is the income method, which is based on data 
from the continuous life conditions household surveys, which is part of the program for 
improving the survey and measurement of life conditions (MECOVI). This poverty 
measure shows transitory poverty, whereas the UBN method indicates structural poverty. 
According with this type of measure, poverty has increased between 1999 and 2000 but 
fallen slightly between 2000 and 2001 (see Table 2). 
 
 
                                                 
4 For example White (1992a, 1992b), Boone (1996), World Bank (2001). 
5 Mosley (1986) was probably the first to point out the micro-macro paradox of foreign aid.    8
Table 1 Bolivia: Population with Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) 
Census  Average annual change 
Region  1976 1992 2001  1976-2001 1992-2001 
Chuquisaca 90,5  79,8  70,1  -0,82  -1,05 
La Paz  83,2  71,1  66,2  -0,68  -0,53 
Cochabamba 85,1  71,1  55,0  -1,21 -1,74 
Oruro 84,5  70,2  67,8  -0,67  -0,26 
Potosí 92,8  80,5  79,7  -0,53  -0,09 
Tarija 87,0  69,2  50,8  -1,45  -1,99 
Santa Cruz  79,2  60,5  38,0  -1,65  -2,43 
Beni 91,4  81,0  76,0  -0,62  -0,54 
Pando 96,4  83,8  72,4  -0,96  -1,23 
Bolivia 85,5  70,9  58,6  -1,08  -1,33 
     Source: INE-UDAPE (2002). 
 
The household survey of 2001 shows that poverty for this year reaches 64.4% at the 
national level; 54.3% for urban areas and 81.1% for rural areas. Although the level of 
poverty is higher in rural areas, the growth in poverty between 1999 and 2001 was higher in 
urban areas, where poverty increased by 3.72 percentage points, compared with an increase 
of rural poverty of 1.86 points. The improvements during 2001, were not sufficient to bring 
poverty back down to the levels of 1999.  
 
Table 2: Monetary poverty in Bolivia, by area, 1999, 2000, 2001 


















Urban  51,72 54,47 54,28 23,65 27,93 26,18 
Capital  City  46,82 52,03 50,54 20,66 25,69 22,28 
Rural  80,12 84,54 81,06 56,72 58,66 55,60 
Bolivia  62,26 65,47 64,39 35,92 39,17 37,29 
Source: MECOVI surveys 1999, 2000, 2001. 
 
In contrast to expectations, female headed households are significantly less poor than male 
headed households. An analysis of the surveys indicate that this is probably due to the 
higher propensity of saving in female headed households.  
 
Given the extent of poverty, Bolivia has defined the fight against poverty as one of its 
priorities, and the government has developed a Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(BPRS) through heavy consultation with national stakeholders. The strategy establishes 
poverty goals from the base year, 1999, until 2015, but due to the unexpected crisis since 
1999, actual poverty reduction is falling way short of targets. 
 
For 2001, the BPRS’s goal of national poverty index was 61.4% compared to the actual 
figure of 64.4%, with substantial shortfalls in both rural and urban areas. For the extreme 
poverty, the BPRS’s goal for 2001 was 35.1% compared to an actual value of 37.3%. 
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The increase of poverty in the short run is related to the disappointing development of the 
Bolivian economy in the last four years. After a period of relative high growth between 
1993 and 1998, years in which the growth rate of the economy was 4.7% in average, the 
growth rate of the Bolivian economy fell to an average of only 1.7% between 1999 and 
2002. According to UDAPE (2002), given the new projections of growth rates, the goals of 
the BRPS will be achieved in the year 2025, long after the deadline of 2015. 
 
In addition, estimations made by UDAPE of the elasticity of poverty with respect to 
changes in GDP show that income increases have only a small effect on poverty. According 
to the estimations, a 1% increase of per capita income, would lead to a 0.6% reduction in 
urban poverty and a 0.3% reduction in rural poverty. These very low elasiticities indicate 
that growth in Bolivia has not been pro-poor and that deep structural changes are needed if 
poverty goals are to be reached.  
 
 
3  National Development Strategies 
 
In the early months of 2001, the Bolivian government presented the Bolivian Poverty 
Reduction Strategy. One of the inputs to the BPRS, was a process of consultation with civil 
society, called the national dialogue. According to the BPRS, the national dialogue “is a 
deliberation between the society and its political system for agreeing on the central 
elements that define the course of a strategy for poverty reduction.” 
 
The BPRS shows four actions for poverty reductions: to create opportunities, increase 
capacities, improve security and protection, and procure more participation and integration. 
These where conceived as the four pillars of the BPRS. In addition, the strategy outlines 
three transversal topics: the ethnic and indigenous people problem, gender equality, and the 
sustainable use of natural resources, preserving the environment. 
 
For each of the four pillars the strategy outlines a series of actions. For the opportunity 
pillar, it highlights the promotion of rural development, incentives for the development of 
small and medium sized enterprises, development of micro finance, technological 
assistance, and increased road infrastructure. In order to increase the productive capacities 
of the poor, the strategy plans an increase in the quality and access to education and health 
services, as well as improved sanitation and housing. To increase security and protection 
for the poor, the BPRS outlines social protection programs, integrated attention to under-
fives, emergency programs for natural disasters, and improved ownership rights. To 
increase the participation and social integration, the Strategy relies heavily on 
decentralization, and has some vague promises of support for citizen organization and 
participation and projects that might reduce ethnic discrimination.  
 
The change of government in August 2002, and the disappointing experience in the 
implementation of the BPRS, generated a series of observations to its original design, 
stressing the need for a reformulation of the BPRS. In relation to the strategy conception, 
there is the impression that the BRPS did not place sufficient emphasis on growth, or even 
examine the sources of growth. There is also a need for prioritizing the actions set forth by   10
the strategy to achieve better results. Finally, it is necessary to generate greater coordination 
between the different elements of the strategy. 
 
The implementation of the BPRS has not been satisfactory, either. According to UDAPE 
(2002), in the opportunity component, one can see advances in institutional strengthening, 
and in some cases in the normative. In contrast to specific policies, programs and plans do 
not show important improvements. For the capacities component, advances are seen in the 
increased allocation of resources to education, health, and productive and social 
infrastructure sectors. However, the following problems have been identified: i) insufficient 
availability of resources to finance current expenditure, ii) lack of consultation at the 
municipal level, lack of prioritization of the public agenda, iii) insufficient coordination 
with other public institutions. In the protection component, the lack of prioritization of the 
actions in the action plan is highlighted. In the participation component, concrete policies 
could not be implemented to reduce social exclusion, since the strategy does not specify 
any concrete actions for advancement in this direction. Some progress in the building of 
social control institutions is acknowledged, but these do still not show an effective 
participation. There are few advances in the cross-cutting themes so far, mainly advances in 
the elaboration and approval of norms. 
 
In relation to the institutional themes, the BPRS outlines the revision of the allocation of 
responsibilities of the decentralized levels (prefectures and municipalities), and the 
strengthening of the social control, but, according to UDAPE, the propositions for judiciary 
reform and the fight against corruption are very general, and do not give action lines that 
allow to implement them. An advance in the Institutional Reform Program is 
acknowledged, and in the implementation of the SIGMA and the SISER (System of 
assessment of the public management by results). 
 
The assessment of UDAPE outlines the need to reformulate the BPRS, in order to 
strengthen the components of the BPRS, to readdress the economic growth towards a model 
with sustainable basis, and to prioritize actions such that the universal goals of health and 
education can be met. In order to do that, it proposes to strengthen the following 
components of the BPRS: the coordination between labour demand and the education 
policies at the secondary level and technical education, the generation of permanent 
employment, more construction, the creation of a school subsidy, and the universalization 
of health services. It also stresses the productive transformation, improving productivity 
through productive chains, the generation of productive municipalities, and the 
transformation of agriculture and industry.  
 
The new BPRS will be incorporated into the General Plan of Economic and Social 
Development (PGDES) in order to generate more coherence within these two processes of 
economic and social development. The PGDES outlines an approach of wealth generation 
in order to reduce poverty, emphasizing incentives for growth with a wide base, high 
employement, and high value added. According to the PGDES, the state has to improve the 
productivity of the economy, promote consultation, institutional development and solidarity 
in order to create the conditions to promote the private investment.  
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The Strategy emphasizes 14 productive chains (10 in agroindustry, 3 in industry, and 1 in 
services), where the activities of promotion of productiveness and competitiveness of the 
country are coordinated, and productive agreements to invest in productive chains can be 
achieved. The state will invest in infrastructure, technology, technical assistance, and the 
development of human capital. It will also assist the production with certification and 
quality norms and help secure access to financing.  
 
The reformulation of the BPRS will be agreed on in a new version of the National 
Dialogue, in consensus between government and civil society about the proposals, ending 
in a productive and social pact. The revised BPRS and the PGDES together with a Fiscal 
and Financial Strategy, will be the instrument to guide public investment towards fulfilling 
the targets set out in these two strategies. The planning process of the PGDES will end with 
the elaboration of a pluri-annual budget, where a national fiscal pact is established. This 
budget will have not only a national character, but also a departmental and municipal one. 
 
 
4  Governance and decentralization  
 
The BPRS proposed to manage the main part of the resources for the fight against poverty 
in a decentralized way. Since the implementation of the Law of Popular Participation, the 
municipal government have had a fundamental role in the management of the public 
investment resources. This role increased further with the Law of the National Dialogue, 
which secures that the resources from the HIPC II initiative will be managed by the 
municipalities. In addition, municipalities have access to the resources of the Productive 
and Social Fund. 
 
The results are disappointing. According to UDAPE (2002), between August 2001 and 
August 2002, municipalities only managed to use 48.1% of the HIPC II resources they 
received. The low capacity of implementation is thought to be the consequence of the low 
formulation and execution capacities in the municipalities, political problems within the 
municipalities, and a flawed design in the legal norms, and the inflexibility of the 
procedures. 
 
The lack of adequate information on the municipal accounts is an obstacle to assess the 
efficiency of resource employment in the municipalities. Many municipalities do not make 
or present financial statements and operative plans. Of the municipalities that do present 
their financial statements, only a few make them according to acceptable accounting norms. 
It is urgent to solve the information problems at the municipalities. SIGMA appears to be 
an answer to the problems of organizing financial information in the municipalities, but its 
implementation is much delayed. 
 
 
5  Fiscal Policy and Public Investment 
 
Table 3 shows the evolution of the consolidated accounts of the Non Financial Public 
Sector for 1998 and 2001, in constant values of 1991. 
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Total revenues fell by 2.4% between 1998 and 2002, while total expenditures increased by 
8.6%, thus turning a small surplus into a large deficit (before pensions). The decrease in 
revenues is mainly the result of the decrease in incomes from the sale of hydrocarbon 
derivatives. 
 
Table 3: Consolidated Operations of the Non-Financial Public Sector 
  Millions of 1991-Bs. Change
 1998 2002 1998-2002
Total revenues  7816 7629 -2.4%
     Current income  7496 7008 -6.5%
         Tax Revenues  3547 3618 2.0%
              Income taxes  3138 3309 5.4%
              Import taxes  383 286 -25.4%
              Mining royalties  26 23 -9.7%
              Hydrocarbon taxes  1175 1268 7,9%
                   IVA and IT  203 0 -100.0%
                   IEHD  585 636 8.7%
                   Royalties  387 632 63.2%
              Hydrocarbons  1259 880 -30.1%
              Other enterprises  273 90 -67.1%
          Current transfers  199 306 53.3%
          Other current income  1043 847 -18.8%
     Capital income  320 621 93.9%
      
Total expenditure  8004 8696 8.6%
     Current expenditure  6245 6377 2.1%
          Salaries  2580 2672 3.6%
          Goods and services  2168 1774 -18.2%
          Interest foreign debt  300 286 -4.7%
          Interest domestic debt  50 292 483.8%
          Current transfers  620 471 -24.1%
          Other current spending  512 845 64.9%
          Non-identified spending  15 38 152.0%
     Capital expenditure  1759 2319 31.8%
      
Surplus without pensions  188 -1067 -668.5%
Pensions -1005 -1353 34.6%
      
Global surplus  -1193 -2419 102.9%
                   Source: Own elaboration based on data from UPF. 
 
The increase in expenditure was mainly due to an increase of 31.8% in the capital 
expenditure and a 438.8% increase interest payments on domestic debt. Spending on goods 
and services as well as currents transfers experienced substantial falls, but not enough to 
compensate for the increase in capital expenditure. 
 
Pension costs have been separated out because of their extraordinary nature. In the 
transition from a pay-as-you-go system to a fully funded system, there is a whole 
generation who gets squeezed, and the government has decided to cover these people,   13
although it is putting heavy pressure on the public budget. Pension costs increased by 
34.6% between 1998 and 2002 contributing substantially to the dramatic increase in the 
global deficit, after pensions. 
 
The growth of the global deficit of the public sector is the salient feature of the evolution of 
the fiscal accounts, and is a peril for the stability of the macroeconomic equilibrium. The 
fiscal deficit has grown from a level of 3.8% of  GDP in 2000, to 6.9 and 8.7% of GDP in 
2001 and 2002, respectively. Preliminary projections place the deficit for the current year 
around 10%. An important part of this deficit is the deficit generated by the pensions 
reform (69.6% and 58.6% of the total deficit for 2001 and 2002, respectively). This deficit 
has been financed mainly with foreign resources. According to WB & BID (2002), foreign 
assistance has played an anti-ciclycal role, increasing their disbursements in recent years. 
However, it is expected that the disbursements will increase further in the following 4 
years, although the Bolivian economy is on its way out of recession. 
 
The government institutions interviewed all agreed that the current expenditures of the 
public sector are very inflexible, and that, given the current political situation, to increase 
tax revenues is not feasible. To cover the financing gap, the government is therefore 
looking for budget assistance from international donors, highlighting the fact that the only 
alternative would be to cut public investment.  
  
The recent acute fiscal deficit has generated problems in the governmental organization to 
supply counterpart funds, thus delaying disbursements of promised foreign assistance. WB 
and BID (2002) indicated the need to review counterpart financing, and reduce it in the 
cases where it goes beyond the minimum requirements.  
 
The public efforts to fight poverty are sustainable in the long run only if the country makes 
a genuine effort for achieving fiscal equilibrium and decides to finance an increasing part of 
the public investment and fight against poverty with its own resources. Nevertheless, in the 
current political conditions, it seems less probable to achieve significant reductions in fiscal 
deficits by increasing taxes. It is necessary to find a formula that avoids a fiscal collapse in 
he short run, and that at the same time creates the incentives to make a genuine internal 
effort to share the costs of poverty reduction. 
 
Table 4 shows the public investment in Bolivia for the years 1998-2002, by sector. Between 
1998 and 2002, $2,828 million was spent on public investment. The bigger  part of public 
investment was addressed mainly to social projects (which for this period represented 
47.3% of total public investment), and to the infrastructure sector (35.3%). Public 
investment to the productive sectors in the period represented only 9% of the total public 
investment, and the multisectorial projects 6.5%. Within the social sector, education 
investment was the most important ($425 million), followed by sanitation ($391 million), 
urban development and housing ($281 million), and health ($238 million). 
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Table 4: Public Investment, 1998-2002 (million dollars) 
  Planned Executed % Execution 
Productive sectors  396.1 305.3 77.1% 
     Hydrocarbons  12.5 5.2 41.2% 
     Mining  28.5 15.3 53.8% 
     Industry and tourism  29.1 26.3 90.4% 
     Agriculture  326.0 258.6 79.3% 
Infrastructure 1053.6 997.9 94.7% 
     Transportation  933.9 882.5 94.5% 
     Energy  68.3 68.6 100.5% 
     Communication  228.0 368.0 161.4% 
     Water resources  51.2 52.4 102.3% 
Social sectors  1445.4 1336.2 92.4% 
     Health and social security  284.0 238.4 83.9% 
     Education and culture  449.6 425.1 94.5% 
     Basic sanitation  423.9 391.3 92.3% 
     Urbanization and housing  287.9 281.4 97.8% 
Multisector 205.8 183.1 89.0% 
TOTAL   3114.8 2828.6 90.8% 
Note: Incluyes estimated investment by municipalities. 
Source: Viceministry for Public Investment. 
 
In the framework of the fight against poverty, the government of Bolivia decided to push 
for investment in the social sectors and in infrastructure, and let the investment in the 
productive sector in private hands. Despite resource restrictions, the public investment 
related to the BPRS achieved $620 million in 2001, only 1.5% below the amount projected 
by the BPRS. It has to be highlighted that the domestic resources that financed the public 
investment related with the BPRS achieved $321 million in 2001, 4% above the amount 
projected by the BPRS. On the other hand, external financing of the BPRS in 2001 
achieved $299 million, 7% below the amount projected by the BPRS.  
 
Table 5 shows the amounts budgeted and executed of the BPRS, by component. This table 
must be read with caution, because the budgeted amounts do not include the HIPC 
resources, while the executed amounts do include them (They reach $18 million for 2001). 
Nevertheless, the table gives insights about the alignment of the public investment with the 
BPRS. The opportunity component shows an execution very close to that programmed. The 
capacity component shows an execution 5% above the programmed. The execution of these 
two components seems to follow the program of the BPRS. These two items of public 
investment are also the most important in the total volume. 
 
On the other hand, in the smaller components of public investment the differences between 
the amounts programmed by the BPRS and executed are more important. This is for 
example the case of the Institutionality component, where only $6.2 million where executed 
out of the $10.8 million planned.    15









Opportunities 286.6  281.1  -1.9% 
    Domestic resources  146.5  143.6  -2.0% 
    Foreign resources  140.1  137.5  -1.8% 
Capacities 258.8  271.8  5.0% 
    Domestic resources  138.8  150.1  8.2% 
    Foreign resources  120.0  121.7  1.4% 
Protection 30.8  24.8  -19.6% 
    Domestic resources  12.4  9.6  -22.3% 
    Foreign resources  18.4  15.1  -17.8% 
Participation 1.7  6.5  280.2% 
    Domestic resources  1.1  2.0  84.8% 
    Foreign resources  0.6  4.4  638.5% 
Transversal themes  23.1  27.5  19.2% 
    Domestic resources  8.4  12.2  45.6% 
    Foreign resources  14.7  15.3  4.1% 
Institutionality 10.8  6.2  -42.4% 
    Domestic resources  1.5  1.6  4.5% 
    Foreign resources  9.2  4.7  -49.4% 
Multisectorial   2.3   
    Domestic resources    2.0   
    Foreign resources    0.3   
HIPC II  18.3     
Total 629.9  620.3  -1.5 
    Domestic resources  308.7  321.2  4.0 
    Foreign resources  321.3  299.1  -6.9 
            Source: Own elaboration base don data from the EBRP and UDAPE (2002). 
 
 
6  Foreign aid and non-monetary indicators of development 
 
This section compares the disbursements of foreign aid in different areas with the changes 
in the non-monetary indicators of development in each sector. As is shown in Table 6, the 
sectors with most foreign assistance in the period 1998-2002 where: Economic Programs 
(17.4%), Rural development (17.3%), Road Infrastructure (16.9%), and institutional 
strengthening (14.9%). After these followed three sectors of basic services: Education 
(8.7%), Health (5.9%) and Sanitation (6.5%). 
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1. Institutional strengthening  414,227  14.9 
2. Education  243,112  8.7 
3. Health  163,289  5.9 
4. Road network  469,232  16.9 
5. Rural development  480,232  17.3 
6. Sanitation  180,973  6.5 
7. Environment  68,247  2.5 
8. Financial system  102,669  3.7 
9. Urban infrastructure  24,707  0.9 
10. Economic programs  483,800  17.4 
11. Alternative Development  110,348  4.0 
12. Productivity and Competitiveness  38,884  1.4 
Total (agencies in study)   2,779,694  100.0 
Other agencies and adjustment  289,850   
Total disbursements  3,069,544   
Source: BM & BID (2003). 
 
In the following, we examine each of these thematic areas. 
 
6.1  Institutional strengthening  
 
The important transformation of the Bolivian state during the last 15 years (in which 
decentralization, privatization and the establishment of a regulatory system stand out), the 
effort to fight corruption, and the modernization of the state, require big institutional 
changes. The international cooperation has devoted an important amount of resources to 
this area (15% of the total), disbursing more than $400 million between 1998 and 2002. 
 
An important part of the effort to strengthen institutions was the attempt to institutionalize 
employment in the public sector, implementing a system of public service based on 
meritocracy rather than political favours. The first attempt was the creation of a civil 
service program, and a superintendency of civil service, for the institutionalization of a 
series of public positions. In that attempt, 450 public positions where institutionalized 
between 1999 and 2000. 
 
After that, a program of institutional reform (PRI) was developed, which tried to face 
institutional problems in an integrated way. In addition, several public institutions made 
institutionalization processes of public positions outside PRI. Since the year 2000, these 
efforts have institutionalized 2000 public sector positions. The PRI program was 
implemented in three ministries (Housing, Agriculture, and Education), and three other 
public institutions (Customs, the National Road Service, and the Tax Service). The 
following table shows the degree of institutionalization of the positions in these institutions. 
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Table 7: The Institutional Reform Program (PRI)  





Housing and basic services  38  33  86.8 
Agriculture 152  152  100.0 
Education 62  0  0.0 
Customs 122  96  78.7 
Tax Services  514  66  12.8 
National Road Services  141  129  91.5 
Total 1,029  336  32.4 
Total Public Sector  42,417  336  0.8 
Source: PRI y SNAP 
 
The achievements, in terms of public positions institutionalized, are still very low 
considering the fact that, according to the national public servants registry, the total number 
of public positions are 42,417
6. Nevertheless, according to the latter registry, 26.5% of  
public servants declare that they have entered the institution in a public competitive 
process. It must be highlighted that the BPRS does not establish indicators for the 
assessment of the progress of the institutionalization process in the country. 
 
The PRI is in the process of reformulation because several flaws have been detected. First, 
the institutionalization process was associated with an increase in the salary which initially 
was provided by foreign aid but later should be covered by domestic resources. However, 
with the present fiscal restrictions, the public sector cannot absorb these costs in a 
sustainable way. Second, an efficient mechanism for assessing and dismissing inefficient 
institutionalized servants was missing, thus weakening the link between performance and 
remuneration. Third, there was a focus on staff and a neglect of rules and procedures which 





The education sector absorbed 8.7% of foreign assistance between 1998 and 2002, 
corresponding to $243 million. During the same period, most education indicators have 
improved systematically (see Table 8). Both gross and net enrolment rates have increased at 
all levels in the public system. In 2001, 87.9% of primary school age children were 
inscribed in public primary school. Another 9.0% were inscribed in private primary school, 
bringing the total net coverage rate for primary school up to 96.9%, very close to the goal 
of universal primary education. 
 
Drop out rates have decreased at all levels of public education, and the promotion rates 
have increased, which suggest that the quality of public education has improved between 
1998 and 2001. The indicator of the educational level of teachers has improved 
                                                 
6 This figure comprises the central administration, decentralized and deconcentrated, entities of departmental 
administration, municipal governments, judiciary power, legislative power, electoral court, and the 
administrative staff of the health and education sector. It does not include the rural and public teachers, 
administrative staff and professors of public universities, police, army, and foreign service.   18
dramatically between 1998 and 2002. The only indicator that showed a deterioration is the 
pupil/teacher ratio. The empirical evidence in Bolivia, however, suggests that the quality of 
education is better in schools that have more pupils per teacher, implying that the evolution 
of the pupil/teacher ratio is not necessarily bad. 
 
Table 8: Public education indicators for Bolivia, 1998-2001 
Indicador 1998 2001 
Gross enrollment (%) 
     Pre-school 
     Primary 








Net enrollment (%) 
     Pre-school 
     Primary 








Drop-out rate (%) 
    Pre-school 
     Primary 








 1998 2002 
Number of schools 
Number of teachers 
% of teachers with teacher education 









        Source: Sistema de Indicadores Educativos (SIE).  
 
The number of public schools increased by 8.3% and the number of teachers by 11.1% 
between 1998 and 2002. The fact that the gross enrollment rate at primary level is very 
close to 100%, suggests that there is sufficient physical capacity to give education to all 
children in Bolivia, now and in the future, especially when considering that in this point of 
the demographic transition, each generation of newborn children is smaller than the 
previous one. 
 
Bolivia has made important progress in the education area, in terms of quantity, and a big 
part of this progress can probably be attributed to foreign aid; directly through the financing 
of educational reform and several other projects, and indirectly through the great emphasis 
that has been put on education, especially through the Millennium Development Goals. 
Nevertheless, these goals have focused almost exclusively on universal primary education, 
overlooking pre-school education and secondary education, as well as the quality in 
education. In 1997, Bolivian students in public schools where among the worst in Latin 
America, according to international academic tests for forth grade
7. 
 
Part of the explanation of the low achievements of public school students, is the fact that 
the children enter first grade without sufficient preparation. Only a small part of public 
students have had two years of pre-scholar education, and, especially in rural areas, many 
children enter the education system for the first time when they are 7 or 8 years old. 
                                                 
7 Andersen & Wiebelt (2003).   19
Empirical studies show that one of the most important factors explaining permanence in the 
education system is the age of entry. The older children are when they start, the higher the 
probability that the students drop out prematurely. As the rate of coverage at primary level 
is already very high, it is probably time to change the focus towards pre-school education, 
which would help increase the presently very low returns to primary education (see 
Andersen & Wiebelt 2003). 
 
The intermediate goals of the capacity component of the BPRS are the following: i) the 
ratio between the number of núcleos
8 with complete primary education and the total 
number of núcleos in rural areas, ii) the share of total non-financial public spending that 
goes to basic education, and iii) the share of total education spending that goes to basic 
education. Table 9 shows the development of each of these indicators together with the 
BPRS targets, and the degree of fulfilment of each goal. 
 
The degrees of fulfilment of the education goals are very high. In fact the first goal has 
been surpassed, while the other two goals have been fulfilled by more than 90%. 
 





2000 2001 2002 
Degree of 
fulfilment 
No. of núcleos with complete primary/ 
total no. of núcleos. (Rural area) 
Obs. 
Goal  80.8%  84.7% 
82.9% 
87.9% 
85.0%  103% 
Basic education spending/ 
Total public spending 
Obs. 
Goal  11%  12% 
13% 
13% 
14%  93% 
Basic education spending/ 
Total education spending 
Obs. 
Goal  72%  69% 
72% 
70% 
75%  94% 





The health sector absorbed 5.9%, or $163 million, of foreign aid during the period 1998-
2002, and it is expected that this proportion will be maintained in the future (WB & BID, 
2003).  
 
In order to fight the very high infant mortality rates in Bolivia, a free health system, the 
National Maternity and Child Health System (SNMN), was implemented in 1994 focusing 
mainly on pregnant women and children under five years of age. This system was expanded 
to a Universal Infant and Mother Insurance system in 2003. 
 
Between 1996 and 2001 the indicators of coverage of health services have improved 
significantly. Table 10 shows that the coverage of institutional births increased from 33% in 
1996 to 54% in 2001. This can have a very beneficial effect on both infant and maternal 
                                                 
8 A núcleo is a group of rural schools consisting of one central school and 5-10 satellite schools. The satellite 
schools usually only offer the first three or the first five years of primary school, after which children are 
expected to attend the central school of the núcleo.   20
mortality, but only if the quality of attention is high. These mortality rates remain high even 
for institutionalized births. 
 
The direct indicators of health have also improved during the period, part of which may be 
attributed to health spending, and part of which can be attributed to the fertility drop 
implied by the demographic transition and general improvements in education.  
 
The reduction in child mortality has had a corresponding beneficial effect on life-
expectancy at birth, which increased from 60 years by the beginning of the nineties, to 63.8 
years in the year 2000. Life expectancy for women in 2000 was 66 years whereas for men it 
was only 62 years. 
 
Table 10: Indicators of public health services in Bolivia, 1996-2001 
Indicator 1996 2001 
Institutionalized births (%) 
DPT3 coverage in infants (%) 







Health spending (% del GDP)        3.1 3.8 
               Source: Bolivia (2002). 
 
Although Bolivia has seen substantial improvements in health, it is still far behind in 
relation to international standards. The mortality rate for children under 5 years in Bolivia 
was 92 in 1998, while the average in Latin America was only 38 deaths, and the average for 
developed countries was 6 deaths for every 1000 children born alive. This leaves a lot of 
room for improvements, especially for rural areas. 
 
The BPRS goal as well as one of the Millenium Development Goals is to reduce the child 
mortality rate to 45 by 2015. This is quite a modest goal, and it should be possible to 
achieve this goal (as well as the maternal mortality goal) just with the voluntary reduction 
in fertility. 
 
Table 11 shows the health goals included in the BPRS. 
 





2000  2001 2002 
Degree of 
fulfilment 
Share of infant pneumonia cases that 
are being treated 
Obs. 
Goal  17%  19% 
18% 
19% 
19%  100% 
Adequate pre-natal care coverage 
Obs. 
Goal  34%  36% 
37% 
34% 
40%  85% 
Institutional birth coverage 
Obs. 
Goal  49%  54% 
53% 
54% 
56%  96% 
Source : EBRP and UDAPE. 
 
In the short run, the goals that have been set have not been completely achieved. Pre-natal 
care is particularly behind targets, despite the implementation of the Universal Infant and 
Mother Insurance system. 
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6.4 Road  Infrastructure 
 
Road construction is one of the most important components of foreign assistance in Bolivia, 
with 16.9% of the total disbursed amount between 1998 and 2002, equivalent to $469 
million. 
 
The road infrastructure in Bolivia is divided into three groups, according to the level of 
responsibility. 
 
1.  The Fundamental Road Network (RVF), which is the responsibility of the National 
Road Service (SNC). It currently has 11.858 kilometres of roads that connect the 
capital cities of the departments. 
2.  The Departmental Network, which is under responsibility of the state governments 
through the Prefectural Road Service (SEPCAM), and aimed at departmental 
integration. 
3.  The Municipal Network, which is under responsibility of the municipalities, making 
connections to the Departmental or the Fundamental Networks.   
 
Table 12 shows the increases in the RVF between 1997 and 2002. The total cost of these 
additions were $159 million (not all is external financing), corresponding to an average cost 
per kilometre of $US 278.000.  
 
Table 12: Important roads and bridges constructed in Bolivia between 1997 and 2002 
Project (total cost)  Period  Kilometres
Roads 1997-2002  572
    RFV Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz – Trinidad ($29 million)  1997-2001  114
    RFV Beni, Santa Cruz – Trinidad ($28 million)  1997-2001  88
    RFV Chuquisaca ($8 million)    35
    RFV Tarija ($39 million)  1997-2001  44
    RFV Santa Cruz ($7 million)  2000-2002  86
    RFV Chuquisaca ($7 million)  1997-2002  17
    RFV La Paz, Bolivia - Chile ($17 million)  2000-2002  188
Bridges    Meters
    Puente Internacional, La Paz ($9 million)  2002 
    Puente Llavini, Cochabamba ($1.0 million)   
    Puente Candorcito, Santa Cruz ($0.7 million)  2003  20
    Puente San Juan del Oro, Santa Cruz ($0.9 million)  2002  70
    Puente Quimome ($0.9 million)  2002  48
    Puente Maniquí, Beni ($11 million)  2001 
    Puente Cocama, Pando ($0.2 million)    30
Source: Servicio Nacional de Caminos (www.snc.gov.bo). 
 
Table 13 shows the roads under construction by July 2003 and their advances. The total 
cost of these projects is 322 millions of dollars for 712 kilometres of roads, implying an 
average budgeted cost of $US 452.000 per kilometre.  
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Table 13: Roads under construction, July 2003 
Project (total cost)  Kilometres  Progress (%)
Ventilla-Tarapaya ($29 million)  84  61
La Mamora-Km 19 ($75 million)  84  58
Abapó-Camiri ($101 million)  189  38
San javier-Concepción ($9 million)  68  38
Ancaravi-Huachalla ($24 million)  135  70
San José-Taperas-Roboré ($70 million)  138  1
Pte. Sacramento-Pre. Arce ($14 million)  14  1
Source: Servicio Nacional de Caminos. 
 
The short run BPRS goal with respect to the road network was to have 47% of the 
fundamental network paved by 2002. Actually, only 32.4% were paved implying a very 
low degree of fulfilment of this goal (see Table 14). 
  





2000  2001 2002 
Degree of 
fulfilment 
Percent of Fundamental Network which 
is paved 
Obs. 
Meta  36%  34% 
44% 
32.4% 
47.0%  69% 
Sources: EBRP and UDAPE. 
 
 
6.5 Rural  development 
 
Because poverty in Bolivia is mainly a rural phenomenon, the development of this area has 
received high priority in the national strategy and it has also received one of the largest 
shares of foreign aid. With 17.3% of total disbursements, this sector has received $480 
million between 1998 and 2002. 
 
An important part of rural development is the increase in irrigated crop area. In addition, 
the increase in land with titles is crucial for providing judicial security over rural properties, 
thus eliminating one of the causes of social unrest. The following table shows the 
accomplishment of these targets. 
 





2000  2001 2002 
Degree of 
fulfilment 
Cultivated land with irrigation (100 
Has.) 
Obs. 
Goal  250  266 
253 
227 
259  87% 
Hectares with land titles  Obs.  11.8  13.5 15.5 
(Million Has.)  Goal    19 26 
60% 
Sources: EBRP and UDAPE. 
 
There is an important level of accomplishment of the goals of expansion of irrigation in the 
short run, whereas the process of land titling is falling behind schedule.  
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6.6 Basic  Sanitation 
 
Foreign assistance to sanitation reached $181 million between 1998 and 2002, 
corresponding to 6.5% of total aid during the period. In 1992, the coverage of the services 
of drinking water in urban area reached 86.8% of the households, whereas in rural area this 
coverage reached 22.4%. By 2001, the coverage of drinkable water services had increased 
to 91.4% of households in urban areas, and to 40.8% in rural areas. Sanitation services 
reached 62.9% of households in urban areas and 17.5% in rural areas in 1992. This 
coverage increased to 80.7% in urban areas and to 37.8% in rural areas by 2001. 
 
The BPRS has goals on the access to piped water and basic sanitation. Table 16 shows the 
degree of fulfilment of these goals for 2002. 
 





2000 2001  2002 
Degree of 
fulfilment 
% of households with piped water 
Obs. 
Goal    62.3% 
 
63.7% 
74.2%  86% 
% of households with basic sanitation 
Obs. 
Goal    61.7% 
 
62.8% 
61.0%  103% 
Source: EBRP y UDAPE. 
 
In the short run the goals for basic sanitation have been accomplished, whereas access to 




The support of the international community for environment represented 2.5% of total 
assistance disbursed between 1998 and 2002, equal to $68 million. A great deal of this 
assistance was addressed to strengthening the evaluation system of the investment projects 
to grant environmental licenses, the implementation of a series of environmental studies, 
and in some cases the implementation of specific environmental projects. 
 
The following table shows the quantity of environmental licenses granted according to the 
type of process and activity between 1997 and 2002. The licenses granted resulting from a 
process of evaluation of environmental impact are those of dispensation certificates and 
environmental impact declarations. On the other hand, the licenses granted through a 
process of quality control of environmental adequacy are the environmental manifesto or 
the environmental adequacy declaration. In both cases there is a clear tendency to increase 
the use of these instruments, which shows a greater use of the instruments of environmental 
management, and more consciousness of the need of use of these by the entrepreneurs. 
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Table 17: Environmental licences issued, by type and sector, 1997-2002 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Environmental impact control process  32 110 107 65  100 201
     Agriculture    3 3 7  1 19
     Mining  6 3 3 2  3 4
     Industry      2  3 3
     Hydrocarbons  22 90 85 44  67 34
     Energy  2 4 9 1  3 11
     Transportation    2  2  6 29
     Communication      1  11 35
     Public health      1    6
     Basic sanitation  2    2  1 18
     Urbanization and housing    2 2 4  1 40
     Water resources    6  1  2 0
     Multisector      1 1  2 2
     Other        1   0
Environmental quality control process  34 10 625 1589  82 
     Agriculture  1 3 1 13  4 
     Mining  3  2 10  28 
     Industry  27 1 26 26  34 
     Hydrocarbons    1 138 62  6 
     Energy  2 3 2 15  7 
     Transportation        5    
     Communication  1 1 456 1456  1 
     Public health             
     Basic sanitation        2  1 
     Urbanization and housing             
     Water resources             
     Multisector    1    1 
     Other             
Source: INE. 
 
Bolivia is a country with large amounts of forest, implying that the sustainable management 
of forest is also a fundamental concern. A system of forestry certification has been 
implemented and it is expanding rapidly from 448,875 certified hectares in 1998 to more 
than 803,985 hectares in 2002. 
 
6.8  The financial system and pensions 
 
Foreign aid for the financial sector and pensions reached $103 million, or 3.7% of total 
disbursements between 1998 and 2002. An important part of this aid has been devoted to 
strengthening the institutions in the sector. Another important component of this kind of 
assistance is the expansion of micro-credit to support the small and micro enterprises, and 
to the rural financial system. 
 
Table 18 shows the evolution of gross credits from organizations devoted to micro-
financing. It is important to note that the gross credits experienced an important growth 
between 1997 and 1999. Afterwards, the amount of credits has been stagnant, even though   25
the rest of the banking system has reduced its credits, as indicated by the relation between 
credits of micro-finance organizations and credits of the whole banking sector. 
 
 
Table 18: Gross credits from micro-finance  
organizations, 1997-2002 
Million dollars
% of all 
bank credit 
1997 169.12  5.0% 
1998 216.72  5.1% 
1999 382.72  9.4% 
2000 378.57  10.6% 
2001 386.73  12.8% 
2002 393.19  14.7% 
Source: INE and Superintendencia de Bancos. 
 
In addition, the micro financing entities show a better performance of their credits. The 
ratio of arrears to credits for the micro-finance sector in June this year was 9.8%, while this 
indicator for the banking sector was 19.3%. In addition, the expansion of micro-finance has 
allowed small towns without financial services to get access to those. Since 1999, micro-
finance entities have been opened in 29 localities with no prior financial entity. 
 
6.9 Alternative  Development 
 
Foreign aid to alternative development exceeded $110 million between 1998 and 2002, 
representing 4% of international assistance to Bolivia during this period. The aim of this 
program is to avoid the production of coca for its transformation into cocaine for 
subsequent export. 
 
The effectiveness in achieving this target substantially increased in the second stage of 
eradication (1998-2001), compared with the first stage (1986-1997), since the incentives 
where changed. In the first stage there was an individual compensation policy for each 
hectare of eradicated coca, which resulted in a vicious circle of eradication ─ individual 
compensation  ─ plantation of new crops. While gross eradication during this period 
reached 42,224 hectares, net eradication reached only 7,100 hectares implying an efficiency 
of only 17%. Until July 1997 the total amount for individual compensation reached $83.6 
million dollars. 
 
In contrast, during the four years 1998-2001, 46,008 hectares where eradicated, and the net 
eradication surpassed 90% of the volume of the gross eradication
9. This is mainly due to  
decree 24963 of 20
th February 1998, which substituted the system of individual 
compensation gradually with one of community compensation, and a large part in species 
(vegetal and animal material, agriculture equipment, construction material, etc.). At the 
same time the amount of compensation decreased from $2,500/ha in 1998 to $500/ha in 
2001. 
                                                 
9 Viceministerio de Desarrrollo Alternativo (2002).   26
 
The year 2001 ended officially the voluntary elimination of illegal coca crops in the tropical 
region of Cochabamba, and any coca crop discovered now will be eradicated, without 
compensation. 
 
It is estimated that the potential supply of cocaine decreased from 237 tons in 1997 to 12 
tons in 2001
10. However, this dramatic reduction in supply has resulted in an increase of the 
coca price from $1.5 per kg of coca leaves before 1998 to $5.6/kg in 2001. This is 
obviously a great incentive to plant coca, and almost all the 21,000 eradicated hectares 
between 2001 and 2002 where new plantations interplanted with licit crops or camouflaged 
in other ways. 
 
Table 19 shows some indicators of coca eradication between 1997 and 2002, while Table 
20 shows some indicators of alternative development. 
 
Table 19: Indicators of coca eradication, 1997 - 2002 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Cocaine paste  10.847,7 8.906,5 6.904,8 5.043,7 4.280,5 4.740,8
Confiscation of Cocaine hydrochloride (kg.)  1.477,1 2.439,6 807,1 555,3 334,1 362,3
Coca plant eradication (ha.)  7.026 11.621 15.353 7.653 9.394 11.839
Source: Viceministerio de Defensa Social. 
 
Table 20 shows the expansion of the licit agricultural frontier. Between 1998 and 2001 the 
expansion of licit agricultural crops in substitution of coca crops was around 15,639 
hectares, with the most important substitutes being bananas and annual crops. This is an 
important expansion, but the area re-planted with licit crops is only 28% of the area 
eradicated during the same period. 
 
Table 20: Expansion of the licit agricultural frontier (hectares) 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Banana (banano)  13,559 12,450 12,940 25,406 
Black pepper  61 163 278 356 
Yucca 6,171 8,000 6,125 6,212 
Citrus fruits  21,201 22,320 23,110 24,702 
Heart of palm  4,876 3,000 2,725 3,160 
Passion fruit  788 158 112 148 
Pineapple 3,952 1,660 1,840 2,012 
Banana (plátano)  9,201 8,300 8,900 
Rice 6,775 8,000 10,110 
Annual crops        12,882 
Other 12,826 16,221 18,405 14,650 
Pasture 25,678 28,232 29,414 31,199 
Total 105,088 108,504 113,959 120,727 
Source: Viceministerio de Desarrollo Alternativo.   
 
                                                 
10 Ibid, p. 106.   27
The GDP from coca production fell dramatically from $93 million in 1998 to $16 million in 
2001. This reduction in income is not compensated by a corresponding growth of the GDP 
from alternative agriculture production in the region, since this fell from a level of $110 




7  Macroeconomic and distributional effects of foreign aid 
 
Section 6 compared the disbursements of foreign aid in different sectors during the last five 
years with various development indicators. However, no cause-and-effect relationships can 
be established as these indicators would also have changed in the absence of the 
disbursements. The only way to separate the effects of aid disbursements from the effects 
of other shocks is to use a Computable General Equilibrium Model (CGE), where it is 
possible to change one variable while holding all other exogenous variables constant. This 
is exactly what is done in this and the following two sections.  
 
The model has a variety of sectors and household types, which allows not only a 
macroeconomic analysis but also an analysis of the distributional effects of foreign aid
12. 
This is very important when poverty is a main concern, since negative distributional 
impacts easily can counteract positive growth impacts in such away that the poor are 
adversely affected even if growth is higher. 
The model is calibrated to the year 1997, and in order to establish a baseline for the 
following decade, the following assumptions have been made: 1) Given that the year 1997 
had unusually high levels of FDI due to the capitalization process, it is assumed that FDI 
decreases by 20% each year until 2002 and thereafter remains constant. 2) Government 
spending is an exogenous variable increasing by 2.5% per year, thus maintaining the size of 
the government more or less constant compared to GDP. 3) Following the trends of the last 
several years, a smooth nominal devaluation of 6% per year is assumed. 4) International 
prices are kept constant at their 1997 levels as is the level of foreign aid. 5) The national 
interest rate is maintained constant at 13%, while the rate of interest on foreign debt is 
assumed constant at 6%. 6) The year 1997 was not affected by the El Niño phenomenon, 
and it is also assumed to be absent in the following 10 years of the baseline simulation
13. 
With these assumptions and maintaining the structure and characteristics of the economy in 
1997, the model predicts an average annual GDP growth rate of 2.5 percent, which 
                                                 
11 Ibid, p. 128. 
12 The model was created as part of the project “Poverty Impacts of Macroeconomic Reforms in Bolivia” 
financed by the German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau and headed by Manfred Wiebelt from the Kiel 
Institute for World Economics. The model is explained in detail in Mercado et al (2003), available on the 
Internet at: http://www.iisec.ucb.edu.bo/pieb/PIEB%20FINAL.pdf.  
13 These assumptions are made to create a “neutral” scenario without positive or negative shocks. Thus, it 
does not reproduce the crisis during 1999-2003. This has the advantage that we can shift the upcoming aid 
boom a few years backward in order to be able to see the long run effects, while it does not affect our 
simulations of the impacts of foreign aid in a significant manner. Aid could have been used to smooth natural 
growth fluctuations, but then aid should be reduced now that we are finishing the recession, instead it is 
predicted to increase by more than 40% according to BM & BID (2003).   28
corresponds closely to the average observed over the last 50 years, and also corresponds 
more or less to the population growth rate. 
In order to analyze the distributional impacts of foreign aid, it is important to understand 
the initial composition of the population and the initial level of incomes. Table 21 shows 
the composition of the economically active population in Bolivia in 1999. The biggest 
group is “Rural small-holders” (39.5%), and this is also the group with the lowest income; 
around $40 per month. The second most important group is “Urban informals” (24.6%) 
who earn around $70 per month. The last group with below average incomes is “Urbn 
unskilled workers” with incomes close to $100 per month. These three groups contain the 
vast majority of poor people in Bolivia and any intervention that improves the situation of 
these three groups would help to decrease poverty.  
 









1. Rural small-holders  1,409,313  39.5  244 
2. Agricultural workers  66,672  1.8  725 
3. Urban unskilled workers  296,451  8.3  651 
4. Urban informals  878,203  24.6  415 
5. Skilled workers  626,368  17.5  1,240 
6. Employers  292,734  8.2  2,683 
Economically active population   3,569,741  100.0  704 
Source: Thiele & Piazolo (2002). 
The two groups with the highest levels of income are “Employers” and “Skilled workers”, 
in this order, and any policy that favors these two groups would tend to worsen the income 
distribution in the country.  
Given the baseline scenario, it is possible to make simulations with the model in order to 
see the direct and indirect effects of different policies. In the present section, we analyze the 
effects of an increase in the level of foreign donations, under different assumptions about 
how these funds are used. 
 
Simulation: Increase in foreign donations    
 
During the period 1998-2002, Bolivia received on average $614 million in foreign aid per 
year. For the period 2003-2006, there are commitments implying that this amount will 
increase to $872 million per year, which means an increase in the level of annual foreign 
aid of $258 million
14.  
 
In this section we simulate the effect of a temporary increase in the level of foreign 
donations of $258 million per year for four years.
15 In order to see not only the positive 
                                                 
14 BM & BID (2003, Table 11). 
15 Donations represent the optimistic case, compared to credit, since donations do not have to be repaid and 
they don’t increase interest payments.    29
effects of the initial expansion, but also the negative effects of the contraction that 
necessarily follows at some point, we simulate an increase in donations during years 2 
through 5, while aid levels return to the baseline levels from year 6 onward. Such a 
simulation allows us to see the direct and indirect effects of foreign aid in the short and 
long run, while maintaining all other exogenous variables constant.  
 
By definition, all official aid is for the government, but the effect of this aid depends 
crucially on how the government decides to spend or invest the money. In this section we 
analyze to extreme cases: one where the government spends all the extra money on current 
spending (administration, pensions, etc.), and another where it invests all the money in 
public capital. The model includes the crucial assumption that public capital (roads, 
electricity networks, research centres, justice system, etc.) makes private capital more 
productive
16. This means that public investment creates true public goods which increase 
the productivity of all individuals and enterprises in the economy.  
 
Figure 1 shows the impact on GDP growth rates in both cases. The first year of extra aid, 
the impact is larger in the case of current spending, but the effect is very short lived. 
Already from the second year, when the economy has had a chance to adjust to the higher 
aid levels, aid will have a negative impact on GDP growth. This negative effect is due to a 
series of adverse secondary effects. 
 
First, a strong influx of dollars into the economy will cause an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, which will punish exporters by making them less competitive on 
international markets, and which will punish producers of locally produced tradables, since 




Second, the expansion of the public sector distracts resources away from the productive 
sectors. The model assumes that skilled workers is a scarce resource, which implies that 
every time the public sector hires a skilled person, there will be one such person less 
available for the private sector, thus necessarily reducing the production in this sector. 
 
In the opposite case, where all the additional funds are used exclusively for public 
investment, the expansive effect is initially smaller (because a large part of investment 
come from imports rather than domestic production), but it remains positive in the long run. 
This is due to the assumption that public capital has a positive effect on the productivity of 
private capital. The results in this scenario are sensitive to the elasticity of public 
investment on the productivity of private investment (to what degree public investment 
generates increases in the productivity of private capital). The elasticity used in this 
simulation takes on a relatively optimistic value, which is only realistic if public investment 
projects are selected according to their impact on productivity. 
                                                 
16 Public capital enters the production functions of the private sectors, implying that an increase in public 
capital increases output, even when holding private capital constant. But private capital would actually tend to 
increase in order to take advantage of the increase in productivity, so we also see a crowding in effect from 
public investment. 
17 The appreciation also has a positive effect arising from the fact that imported capital goods become 
cheaper, which permits more investment and thus higher growth in the future.     30
 
Figure 1: The impact of extra foreign aid of $258 million 
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When the level of aid falls in year 6, a strong contraction is experienced, especially in the 
case where the funds were used for current spending. In this case, after having received 
more than $1 billion in extra aid, the level of GDP is smaller than in the case without this 
aid (see Figure 2). In the case of investments in public capital, on the other hand, there is a 
permanent positive effect. 
 
Figure 2: The impact of an increase in foreign donations of  
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In both cases do we observe a positive impact of foreign aid, but in the case of pure current 
spending, the advantage is temporary, and the longer the influx of aid is maintained, the 
smaller the impact. This is due to the behavioral adjustments of people when they get used 
to high levels of aid and public spending. With additional funds, the sectors that include   31
public administration and management of international projects become relatively more 
attractive for skilled people, which implies that they abandon the productive sectors, and in 
the long run even adjust their education choices in order to take advantage of the 
opportunities for rent-seeking that exist in these sectors
18.  
 
In terms of income distribution, the impacts differ greatly between the two extreme cases 
analyzed. In the case where more aid is used exclusively for current spending, the ones who 
benefit most are the skilled workers in urban areas, since these account for most of 
government spending (see Figure 3a). Those who lose most are rural workers and 
employers. Rural workers lose because they work in modern agriculture, an export sector 
which gets hurt by the real appreciation. The employers lose because their enterprises 
become less competitive due to the appreciation. In addition, it is difficult for them to retain 
skilled workers in there enterprises, given the competition from the public sector and the 
international aid projects. Average incomes are higher than in the base scenario until year 8, 
but the three large and poor groups, which are our main concern, lose both in the medium 
and the long run.  
 
In the case where foreign aid is converted fully into public capital, the distributional impact 
is completely different. The main winners are urban informals, employers, and unskilled 
workers who are typically employed in public investment projects. The only group that 
loses in this scenario is rural workers, but even they recover when aid returns to normal 
levels, and they also benefit in the long run due to the generally higher level of productivity 
and incomes in the economy (see Figure 3b). 
  
In the case of current spending, the average income in the year 10 is lower than it would 
have been if no extra aid had been received. In contrast, in the case of public investment, 
average incomes in year 10 would be about 2.7% higher than in the baseline scenario. 
 
                                                 
18 To the extent that the education they acquire also is relevant for the productive sectors, this may have a 
positive effect on GDP in the long run since people are accumulating human capital and savings which can be 
used for productive purposes when aid levels are reduced.      32
Figure 3: The impact of additional foreign donations of $258 million 
per year during years 2-5 on real incomes of different types of households 
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Given the very different possible effects of the same foreign donations, it becomes of great 
importance to know the most likely use of foreign aid.  
 
The Viceministry of Public Investment and External Financing (VIPFE) claims that 100% 
of foreign aid is destined at public investment
19, but according to World Bank (1998), the 
fungibility of money implies that “what you see is not what you get.” When donors 
increase the funds aimed at public investment, the government can reduce domestic 
resources for this purpose until the relationship between investment and spending coincides 
with the preferences of the government. This is not necessarily bad, and in some cases 
clearly necessary, since investment in physical capital (like schools and hospitals) will not 
                                                 
19 Bolivia (2001, p. 476).   33
be productive unless it is accompanied by current spending (like salaries for teachers and 
nurses). 
 
In 1997, the disbursements of foreign aid amounted to $637 million, while the “investment” 
executed by VIPFE only amounted to $548 million
20. This clearly shows that external 
financing substitutes for internal financing, since it is impossible to imagine that the 
government has preference for zero or negative public investment, especially in a year with 
GDP growth of 5.0%. 
 
Here it should be mentioned that the official classification between current spending and 
investment not necessarily correspond to the theoretical counterparts. On the one hand, a 
substantial part of public investment does not turn into public capital that increases the 
productivity of everybody (for example the purchase of vehicles for ministers or project 
leaders), and, on the other hand, a part of current spending is really investment (for example 
some education spending). It is thus very difficult to distinguish between investment and 
spending, but in any case it is likely that the ratio corresponds more to the priorities of the 
government than to the priorities of the donors
21. The authors estimate that the proportion 
that really turns into public goods (that increase productivity) is likely to fall in the interval 
25-40%. 
 
Figure 4 shows the effect of extra foreign aid on the level of GDP, if the public investment 
share falls in the range 25-40%. There is a clear positive effect during the four years of 
extra aid with GDP being about 1% higher than in the case of no extra aid. In the long run 
there is a clear difference between a 25% investment share and a 40% investment share, 
with GDP being about 0.5% higher in the latter case. This shows the importance of 
choosing projects with a large component of public capital
22.   
 
The groups that benefit and the groups that lose are the same as in the case of pure current 
spending, although the gains and losses are less pronounced (see Figure 5). For both the 
low and the high level of investment, there will be a worsening in the income distribution in 
favor of skilled workers and against rural workers, employers, and rural small-holders. 
With a 25% investment share, the largest and poorest group, the rural small-holders, are 
worse of during all years, compared to the baseline scenario, implying that the aid 
contributes to a deepening of rural poverty. In the case of the high investment share of 40%, 
this group is left with a close to neutral impact. In both cases, there is a slightly positive 
impact on urban informals, implying that aid will tend to reduce urban poverty. 
 
                                                 
20 VIPFE (2003): www.vipfe.gov.bo.  
21 The international cooperation has had great success in forming the priorities of the government, which 
means that the differences in priorities between donors and government are probably not large, especially at 
high levels of government. At lower levels, however, project executors tend to be more concerned about their 
own benefits than the long run impacts of the project. It is also worth having in mind that the level of 
corruption in Bolivia is among the highest in the World, according to Transparency Internacional 
(www.transparency.org ). 
22 In the most optimistic case, GDP would be about 1% higher than the baseline scenario during the first few 
decades. 1% of GDP corresponds to approximately $75 million, which means that it would take about 14 
years to recover the $1,032 million of extra help, if it were to be repaid.    34
 
Figure 4: The impact of an increase in foreign donations of  
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Employers also lose, especially in the case with low investment share. This contributes to 
an improvement in the income distribution, but it worsens the incentives for private 
enterprise and private investment, which is clearly an undesirable side-effect of foreign aid. 
 
In the most optimistic case, foreign aid has a permanent positive effect on growth through 
the creation of public capital and it has a beneficial effect on urban poverty. The model 
predicts that aid has little capacity to reduce rural poverty, however, and this has pretty 
much been confirmed by actual experience. Aid has been heavily targeted at rural areas 
during the last decade, while rural income poverty has barely nudged. There have been 
significant advances in non-monetary indicators, but the increases in education, the 
improvements in health services, the expansion of the road system, and the arrival of 
electricity have not translated into significantly higher income earning capacity in rural 
areas. 
 
According to World Bank (2001) one of the most important impacts of foreign aid arises 
from the transfer of technology and ideas: new management methods, new analytical 
instruments, new technology, and the demonstration of basic principles like integrity, 
quality, responsibility, punctuality, service, etc. 
 
However, foreign aid can also stimulate the formation of some less desirable values and 
habits. For example, with a massive influx of aid, people may learn that it is not necessary 
to sow before you harvest; it is possible to demand and receive without contributing. In 
fact, when aid is heavily targeted at the poor, the beneficiaries may perceive that the less 
they sow themselves, the more they will receive. Or still worse, they may get the 
impression that they themselves are not responsible for and capable of escaping poverty, 
that change has to come from the outside. This is a very counterproductive mentality, since   35
it justifies the passivity of the poor instead of mobilizing an internal force directed at 
improvements, growth, and escape from poverty.   
 
Figure 5: The impact of additional foreign donations of $258 million 
per year during years 2-5 on real incomes of different types of households 
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Instead of motivating poor people to escape poverty, foreign aid may tend to become like 
an overprotecting mother who clearly wishes the best for her children, but at the same time 
as she provides for all their needs and protects them against all dangers, she delays their 
development and independence.  
  
   36
8  External debt and the HIPC initiative 
 
Bolivia’s public external debt has stayed more or less constant at a level of $4 billion 
during the last decade. This has only been possible due to various rounds of debt 
forgiveness. Between 1990 and 1997, Bolivia was forgiven about $903 million from the 
Paris Club creditors. In September 1998, Bolivia reached the completion point for HIPC I 
and received debt relief with a net present value of $448 million, and in June 2001 it 
received another $854 million in debt relief through HIPC II (Andersen & Nina 2001). 
 
The purpose of this section is to analyze the impact of the HIPC II initiative, which has 
been a catalyst for the decentralization process in Bolivia through the Ley del Diálogo 
Nacional 2000, which destines all the recources from HIPC II to the municipalities through 
a special account (Cuenta Especial Diálogo 2000) and the Fondo Solidario Municipal. 
Table 22 shows the relief scheduled under this initiative. The average level of relief 
between 2001 and 2007 is $91 million per year, but in reality there is a delay in 
disbursements, and an even bigger delay in spending.  
 
Table 22: Debt relief scheduled and available under HIPC II. 










2001 45  15.6  5.0 
2002 108  88.3  60.9 
2003 104  -  - 
2004 106  -  - 
2005 100  -  - 
2006 92  -  - 
2007 84  -  - 
Sources: a: IMF (2001, Table 17). b: UDAPE (2002). 
 
In order to simulate the effect of HIPC II in the CGE model, we assume that the relief 
increases the resources available for the government by approximately $100 million per 
year from year 2
23. In the model, there is no conceptual difference between donations in 
dollars and debt relief. The government will in both cases have more money available for 
spending and investment. The only difference would arise if the municipal governments 
spend the money in a different way than the central government. 
 
It is plausible that the spending taking place in the municipalities will have a smaller public 
good component, as their circle of concern naturally is smaller. The municipal governments 
are concerned only about the inhabitants of the municipality, while the central government 
should be concerned about all inhabitants in the country. In addition, the uses of the HIPC 
II resources are fixed by law, which means that the municipalities are not free to optimize 
the use of the resources. Finally, the capacity for project implementation is very low in the 
poorest municipalities and those are the ones that receive most funds. For all these reasons, 
it is likely that only a small part of HIPC II resources will be transformed into public 
capital, and for simulation purposes, we assume that this share is 25%. 
  
                                                 
23 This is an approximation which greatly simplifies the simulation without modifying the conclusions.      37
Figure 6 shows that in this case, the HIPC II initiative will have a positive effect on GDP 
growth, but only the first year. Thereafter, growth rates return to their normal levels. This is 
due to the same mix of positive and negative effects mentioned in the previous section. An 
additional danger with the recurrent rounds of debt relief, is that governments may perceive 
that there is no danger in getting heavily indebted, because there will always be a chance of 
having this debt forgiven. They perceive debt as equivalent to donations. 
 

























































The distributional effects are exactly the same as in the case of donations, which means a 
redistribution of incomes in favour of skilled workers to the detriment of rural workers, 
employers, and rural small-holders. Again, the biggest and poorest group is worse off 
during all years, compared to the case of no HIPC II relief, implying that the debt relief, 
contrary to intentions, contributes to increasing and deepening rural poverty. It also 
contributes to reducing the incentives for private enterprise. 
 
 
9  The productive sectors and the role of exports 
 
Table 23 shows the composition of the productive sectors in Bolivia in 1997. The biggest 
sector is “Formal services” which includes commerce, transportation y storage, financial 
services, hotels and restaurants, and all kinds of formal personal, social and business 
services. The second biggest sector is “Consumer goods” which includes food, beverages, 
clothes, leather, wood, paper, wood products, and paper products. Thereafter follows 
“Intermediate goods” which includes all the products that are neither consumer goods nor 
capital goods. The fourth sector is “Informal services” which includes domestic services, 
65% of trade, 34% of personal and social services, and 29% of hotel and restaurant 
activities. 
 
The table also shows the exports of each sector. It is clear than the most important export 
sectors are “Consumer goods”, “Formal services” and “Mining”. The part of formal 
services that are counted as export are mainly the services related to tourism and travel. Of 
less importance follows “Intermediate goods”, “Modern agriculture” and “Hydrocarbons.”   38
The “Coca” sector was relatively small in 1997, but it is the sector most dedicated to 
exports (with 81% of production being exported). 
 
Table 23: Productive sectors in Bolivia, 1997  
   Production  Exports  Exports 
Sector  (1000 Bs.)  (1000 Bs.)  (% of prod.) 
Traditional agriculture  5593.6  454.1  8.1 
Modern agriculture  2922.5  713.5  24.4 
Coca 404.5  326.5  80.7 
Hydrocarbons 2135.7  525.1  24.6 
Mining 2513.2  1586.6  63.1 
Consumer goods  16632.5  2221.5  13.4 
Intermediate goods  9836.3  1009.0  10.3 
Capital goods  6543.1  56.5  0.9 
Electricity, water, gas  1790.4  1.9  0.1 
Construction 3484.7  0.0  0.0 
Informal services  6897.4  0.0  0.0 
Formal services  21550.9  1891.7  8.8 
Public sector  6375.0  4.9  0.1 
Source: Social Accounting Matrix used for the CGE model. 
 
Exports are important for a small, heavily indebted country like Bolivia, because it 
generates foreign exchange needed to service debt and to import capital goods for 
investment. With the aim of increasing exports the government is heavily promoting the 
hydrocarbon sector. This sector, however, has relatively few links with the rest of the 
economy and is intensive in capital and skilled labor, implying that the expansion of this 
sector will tend to worsen the income distribution.    
 
In this section we apply the CGE model to show that there are other sectors which have a 
more beneficial impact on poverty, since they simultaneously increase average incomes and 
improve the distribution of income. This is done through simple simulations that stimulate 
each export sector, one by one, through a 15% increase in export prices, while maintaining 
all other exogenous variables constant
24. It is a one-time increase in year 2, after which 
prices stay constant at the higher level.   
 
In no case does such a positive shock lead to permanently higher growth, and even the short 
run effect is modest because the expansion of one sector’s exports will cause a slight 
appreciation of the real exchange rate, which in turn will cause a slight contraction in all the 
other export sectors.  
 
While there is virtually no effect on aggregate growth rates, the expansion of one sector at 
the expense of the others can cause substantial changes in the income distribution, as shown 
in Table 24. The table shows the main winners and losers arising from the expansion of a 
                                                 
24 The only exception is the “Coca” sector, where the price increase is of only 9% rather than 15%, since the 
model did not converge with the larger price increase.   39
particular sector, as well as the change in average income levels for all households in the 
country and the change in the Gini coefficient. 
 






(change in real incomes) 
Losers  







Agriculture   +15% 
Rural workers (+14%) 
Urban informals (+0.7%) 
Employers (0.5%) 
Unskilled workers (-2%)  +1.4%  -0.5 
Coca +9%  Rural workers (+8%) 
Rural small-holders (+4%)  Unskilled workers (-1%)  +0.6%  -0.9 
Hydro-
carbons  +15%  Urban informals (+0.4%)  Rural workers (-1%)  +0.0%  +0.1 
Mining +15%  Employers (+4%) 
Unskilled workers (+3%) 
Rural workers (-12%) 
Rural small-holders (-6%)  +0.7% +3.2 
Consumer 
goods  +15%  Urban informals (+4%) 
Rural small-holders (+3%) 
Rural workers (-2%) 
Unskilled workers (-1%)  +0.2% -0.5 
Intermediate 
goods  +15%  Urban informals (+1%)  Rural workers (-4%)  -0.1%  +0.6 
Formal 
services  +15%  Urban informals (+1%) 
Employers (+1%)  Rural workers (-1%)  +0.5%  +0.5 
Source: Own elaboration based on simulations with a CGE model. 
 
The sector that shows the most beneficial impacts from such a shock is “Modern 
agriculture” Average incomes increase by 1.4% while the Gini coefficient drops by half a 
point. The winners are rural workers, urban informals and employers, while the principal 
losers are unskilled workers in urban areas.  
 
There are only two other sectors which simultaneously increase average incomes and 
improve the income distribution: “Coca” and “Consumer goods”. These two sectors have a 
particularly beneficial effect on rural poverty since their expansion would significantly 
increase incomes of the biggest and poorest group of households: Rural small-holders. The 
“Consumer goods” sector also has a very beneficial effect on urban poverty as it increases 
incomes of the second biggest and second poorest group: Urban informals. 
 
Although the expansion of the “Mining” sector would have a positive impact on the 
average level of incomes, it has a very adverse effect on the distribution of income, 
increasing the Gini coefficient by 3.2 points. No other sector has such an adverse effect on 
the income distribution. The fact that rural small-holders lose a lot means that the 
expansion of mining would tend to increase rural poverty. 
 
The expansion of the “Hydrocarbon” sector will have little effect on average incomes for 
the households but cause a slight worsening in the income distribution. It causes substantial 
incomes for the government, but even after these funds have been spent and invested, 
households are unlikely to be better off. 
 
Based on this comparative analysis of the export sectors in Bolivia, we conclude that the 
three sectors who have the best possibilities of reducing poverty are: “Modern agriculture”, 
“Coca”, and “Consumer goods” since the expansion of these sectors simultaneously   40
increases average incomes and improves the income distribution. In contrast, the mining 
sector has a very adverse effect on the income distribution, and the hydrocarbon sector only 
benefits the government. 
  
When export prices change in just one sector, there is no aggregate effect on growth, since 
the larger exports of that sector will be compensated by smaller exports in the other sectors. 
However, if all export prices have a negative long run trend, as has been the case in 
Bolivia
25, this will have a negative effect on growth. With less exports, we will have less 
capacity to import, and this is especially critical in the case of capital goods since these are 
essential for the maintenance and expansion of our productive capital, and for which we 




10  Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Nina & te Velde (2003) and te Velde (2003) review the effects of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) on growth and inequality in Bolivia and conclude that the boom in FID 
during the period 1996-2001 has had a very limited impact on growth and an adverse effect 
on the income distribution, which implies that FDI has not contributed to the reduction in 
income poverty. One of the explications for the disappointing results is that FDI has been 
concentrated in capital intensive sectors and sectors intensive in skilled workers, like 
hydrocarbons, telecommunications and electricity, while the three sectors which were 
identified above as having the most capacity to decrease poverty have received very little 
FDI (see Table 25). 
 
“Modern Agriculture” and “Consumer goods” received 0.1% and 4.5%, respectively, of the 
approximately $5 billion of accumulated FDI during the period 1996 - 2001. In contrast, the 
“Hydrocarbon” sector, which has poor linkages to the rest of the economy, received more 
than a third of all FDI during the period. 
 
The service sectors, especially telecommunications and electricity, received the main part 
(56.1%) of all FDI during the period. This has caused substantial improvements in the 
coverage of services, but mostly for the urban middle class, while the benefits for the poor 
have been quite limited, and in some cases even negative. The negative impact can be 
exemplified by the Water War in Cochabamaba in April 2000, where the local protests 
against the negative consequences of privatization forced the government to cancel the 
contract with the transnational consortium “Aguas del Tunari”.  
 
The conclusions of Nina & te Velde (2003) are confirmed by the study by Andersen & 
Faris (2002), which uses a CGE model to show that the Natural Gas boom in Bolivia has an 
adverse effect on the income distribution and only a modest long run impact on GDP 
growth. The study by Jemio and Wiebelt, using another CGE model of Bolivia, arrives at 
the same conclusion about the impact of FDI in Bolivia.  
 
                                                 
25 Nina & Brooks (2001). 
26 Mercado et al (2003), Jemio & Wiebelt (2003).   41
 
Table 25: Foreign Direct Investment, by sector, accumulated 1996-2001 
 
Sector 
Distribution of FDI 
(%) 
Primary 35.5 
    Hydrocarbons  34.1 
    Mining  1.3 
    Modern agriculture  0.1 
Manufacturing 8.0 
    Consumer goods  4.5 
    Intermediate goods  3.5 
    Capital goods  0.0 
Services 56.1 
    Telecomunications  14.1 
    Construction  10.2 
    Electricity  7.3 
    Transportation of Natural Gas  5.3 
    Transportation  3.3 
    Financial intermediation   4.7 
    Other services  11.3 
Total ($US million)  4,965 
                   Source: Nina & te Velde (2003). 
 
However, just like foreign aid has had a positive impact on some non-monetary indicators 
of well-being, FDI may have had a positive effect on the level of certain services. This is 
particularly the case with telephony, which with the spread of cell-phones suddenly became 




11  Conclusions and recommendations  
 
During the last five years, Bolivia received foreign aid amounting to more than $3 billion, 
distributed across thousands of projects. The short time period available for this study 
obviously do not permit us to evaluate the effect of all these projects at the micro level. 
However, we have tried to make a macro evaluation, taking advantage of the availability of 
a CGE model which captures the structure and idiosyncrasies of the Bolivian economy. 
 
The results show that even thought there are good results at the micro level and good 
impacts on non-monetary poverty indicators, foreign aid has little permanent impact on 
incomes and poverty at the macro level. This is mainly due to the fact that aid is so massive 
in Bolivia that it distorts incentives against sustainable productive activities.  
  
The projects that are most likely to have a positive long run impacts on growth in Bolivia 
are those which produce public capital which improves the productivity of large groups of 
people and their private capital. In this case, aid can help reassign resources away from 
activities that produce normal goods towards activities that produce public goods, which 
benefit more people. Examples of this kind of public goods are projects which reduce   42
corruption, research that helps eliminate diseases, systems that fortify ownership rights, and 
projects that stimulate the adoption of technologies adequate for a land-locked country with 
low population density.  
 
Projects can help improve the income distribution and reduce poverty if they transform 
unskilled labor into skilled labor, and thus reduce the scarcity of skilled workers. In this 
context it is important that the skills learned are relevant and attractive for employers, so 
that the investment in education and training will actually translate into higher productivity 
and higher wages. 
 
Finally, projects that help small and medium sized enterprises in the consumer goods sector 
have a relatively high potential for reducing poverty, as this sector benefits the two big 
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